Azért annyira tényleg nem egyszerű a késeltetési korlátok miatt.

"The phone-side relaying device was positioned in a separate room from the iPhone, approximately 7 metres away from the phone. The vehicle-side relaying device was able to unlock the vehicle when within placed within a radius of approximately 3 metres from the vehicle."

A régebbieket még minding egyszerűbb lopni.

Az meg a másik kérdés, hogy ki a jó isten lopna egy Teslát, amiben az utolsó csavar is system lockolt.

Kwikset:
September 16, 2021: Relay attack concern reported to Kwikset customer service online portal
September 23, 2021: Initial contact with Spectrum Brands HHI engineering lead over email to schedule a voice call
September 30, 2021: Disclosure of draft advisory over email, and voice call discussion of relay attack issue with Spectrum Brands HHI engineering. Spectrum Brands HHI notified of our intent to publish research regarding BLE relay attacks and their applicability to many products including Kevo smart locks. High level discussions on nature of relay attack and mitigation approaches. Spectrum Brands stated that they will investigate and discuss possible mitigation approaches internally.
October 13, 2021: Follow-up discussion with broader Spectrum Brands HHI engineering team regarding attack setup details and mitigation approaches

Tesla:
April 21, 2022: Disclosure to Tesla Product Security
April 28, 2022: Response from Tesla Product Security stating that relay attacks are a known limitation of the passive entry system.
May 9, 2022: Tesla Product Security notified of NCC Group’s intent to publish research regarding BLE relay attacks and their applicability to Tesla products.

BT SIG:
April 4, 2022: Disclosure to Bluetooth SIG
April 19, 2022: Response from Bluetooth SIG confirming that relay attacks are a known risk, and that more accurate ranging mechanisms are under development.
April 19, 2022: Follow up message to Bluetooth SIG clarifying certain details of relay attack based on questions from the SIG.

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